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Gilles Cuniberti*
This article analyses the nature of the relief pending fi nal determination that is provided for 
by Article 13 of the Cape Town Convention. It contends that the language and legislative 
history of Article 13 do not allow a fi nal conclusion on the nature of Article 13 relief to be 
reached. Article 13 can be characterised as a hybrid between a fi nal remedies provision and 
one that addresses interim relief. It does not fi t with any of the remedies commonly found in 
national legal systems. It is argued that the lack of clarity of the purpose of the provision not 
only makes it diffi cult to give any guidance to future Convention interpreters, but also reduces 
its usefulness, as transactional lawyers and their clients will want to know what they are 
actually establishing through an Article 13 clause. The article therefore proposes two models 
for Article 13: interim relief and an advance enforcement remedy. The rationale for each is a 
particular goal that parties might want to pursue when availing themselves of the possibility of 
stipulating for Article 13 remedies in their contract.
1. Introduction
Article 13 of the Cape Town Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
(hereafter the ‘Convention’) has provided for 
Relief Pending Final Determination (‘Article 
13 relief ’). Article 13 relief will allow credi-
tors to obtain speedy relief from a court in 
various forms listed in Article 13(1) and in 
supplementing provisions of the protocols to 
the Convention. Article 13 only mentions two 
requirements for obtaining such relief, namely 
that the creditor adduce evidence of default by 
the debtor, and that the debtor has agreed to its 
availability. Article 13(1) reads:
Article 13 – Relief pending fi nal deter-
mination
(1) Subject to any declaration that it may 
make under Article 55, a Contracting State 
shall ensure that a creditor who adduces evi-
dence of default by the debtor may, pending 
fi nal determination of its claim and to the 
extent that the debtor has at any time so 
agreed, obtain from a court speedy relief in 
the form of such one or more of the follow-
ing orders as the creditor requests:
 (a) preservation of the object and its value;
 (b) possession, control or custody of the 
object;
 (c) immobilisation of the object; and
 (d) lease or, except where covered by sub-
paragraphs (a) to (c), management of the 
object and the income therefrom.
Article 13 will undoubtedly puzzle users of the 
Convention. Article 13 relief does not seem to 
correspond to any relief traditionally found in 
national legal systems. Stakeholders will there-
fore wonder whether Article 13 ought to be 
understood as establishing a completely novel 
form of relief or whether, by contrast, the goal 
of the drafters was to build on national legal 
systems and to import into the Convention 
remedies which have long been available in 
domestic laws and have shown their usefulness. 
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The answer to this question will be critical to 
decide how to interpret Article 13. If Article 
13 relief is to be understood as a transplant of 
particular relief commonly found in national 
legal systems, it will be natural to turn to the 
comparative law of remedies for that purpose. 
The Offi cial Commentary on the Conven-
tion states that Article 13 was meant to build 
on relief commonly available in national legal 
systems, though without indicating which 
one. 1 If, on the contrary, the Relief is under-
stood to be a novel remedy, it will be important 
to appreciate the goal pursued by the drafters 
in order to interpret Article 13 in accordance 
with that goal.
None of these views is in contradiction 
with the fundamental goal of the drafters to 
achieve uniformity by creating autonomous 
remedies. There is no doubt that this is the 
main purpose of the Convention. Article 5 of 
the Convention, which governs its interpreta-
tion, provides that ‘regard is to be had to its 
purposes as set forth in the preamble, to its 
international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity and predictability in its 
application’. Such uniformity would only be 
achieved if remedies of the Convention in 
general, and Article 13 remedies in particular, 
were considered as autonomous remedies, and 
not as remedies governed by national law.2 This 
obvious proposition, however, is not helpful 
to defi ne positively which remedies Article 13 
actually establishes. As will be explained below, 
the Convention leaves unsettled many issues 
with regard to the legal regime of Article 13 
remedies. These issues can be addressed in two 
ways. The fi rst is to defi ne a novel and innova-
tive legal regime for Article 13, and to create 
a sui generis remedy. The second is to build 
on the comparative law of remedies for the 
purpose of supplementing Article 13 and there-
fore for defi ning an equally autonomous legal 
1 Roy Goode, Offi cial Commentary on the Convention 
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and Protocol 
thereto on Matters Specifi c to Aircraft Equipment (revised 
edn, UNIDROIT 2008) para 4.108.
2 Ibid para 2.60 fn 16, para 4.108.
regime. It is perfectly conceivable to create an 
autonomous remedy inspired by national laws. 
Of course, one should not forget that Article 
5(2) of the Convention calls for interpreting 
matters governed by the Convention but not 
expressly settled by it in conformity with the 
principles on which the Convention is based, 
and concludes that national laws should be 
consulted only in the absence of such princi-
ples. Article 13, however, establishes a judicial 
remedy. The issues of interpretation that it will 
raise will essentially be procedural in charac-
ter. It is highly unlikely that the principles of 
the Convention will be useful for determining 
rules of procedure.
A related question is whether, in any case, 
one could realistically hope to fully harmonize 
a procedural remedy. It is a virtually universal 
rule that procedure is governed by the law of 
the forum, and no international convention has 
ever tried to provide for a different rule. 
 Unsurprisingly, Article 14 of the Convention 
expressly provides that the law of the forum3 
will determine procedural requirements for 
exercising remedies afforded by the Conven-
tion. The civil procedure of Contracting States, 
however, will often offer many forms of relief 
which will be governed by different procedural 
rules. It will therefore be necessary to charac-
terize Article 13 relief for the purpose of 
determining which procedural rules apply. 
Despite the repeated exhortations of the Offi -
cial Commentary on the Convention that 
Article 13 ‘is to be interpreted in accordance 
with the Convention, not by reference to 
national law’,4 reference to national law simply 
seems unavoidable, at least for defi ning part of 
3 It seems that the purpose of Article 14 is merely to 
confi rm the traditional rule that the law of the forum 
controls procedure, and that the reference to ‘the law of 
the place where the remedy is to be exercised’ is to be 
understood as a reference to the law of the place where 
the action will be initiated. If the goal of the provision 
is to include in the equation the law of the place where 
the remedy will produce its effect, the matter is entirely 
different. 
4 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 2.60 fn 
16, para 4.108.
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the procedural regime of Article 13. The auton-
omy of the remedies established by Article 13 
can only be partial.
This article is structured as follows. In Part 2, 
I explore what the rationale behind Article 13 
might be. I fi nd that the purpose of the provi-
sion is unclear. In Part 3, I argue that this lack 
of clarity is unlikely to be welcomed by users 
of the Convention who will only be interested 
in providing for remedies with a clear aim and 
legal regime. I therefore propose two models 
for Article 13 which users of the Convention 
might want to adopt. In Part 4, I discuss how 
these choices will affect availability of similar 
remedies under national law. Finally, in Part 5, 
I discuss jurisdiction to grant Article 13 relief.
2. Assessing the purpose of relief pending 
fi nal determination
(a) Interim relief
Article 13 could fi rst be understood as establish-
ing a form of interim relief. Several provisions 
of the Convention characterize Article 13 relief 
as such. Article 13(4) implicitly provides that 
the relief is only one of the possible ‘forms of 
interim relief ’ that could be made available to 
creditors. Article 43(2) provides a jurisdictional 
rule for granting relief under Article 13(1)(d) 
or ‘other interim relief by virtue of Article 
13(4)’. Finally, in most versions of the Conven-
tion, the title of Article 13 refers to provisional 
measures. In the French version, the title of 
Article 13 is simply ‘provisory measures’.5 The 
Spanish and Russian versions employ longer 
titles, which include the term ‘provisional’6 or 
‘temporary’7 measures. Interestingly, however, 
the English version does not.8 It seems that 
the English drafters consciously avoided those 
5 ‘Article 13 – Mesures Provisoires’.
6 Spanish: ‘Articulo 13 – Medidas provisionales 
sujetas a la decisión defi nitiva’.
7 Russian: ‘Статья 13. Временные меры по защите 
прав’. 
8 It states ‘Relief Pending Final Determination’.
words.9 They may have wanted to use instead 
more neutral terms which simply describe 
the remedy. At the same time, the description 
is precisely that the relief afforded by Article 
13 aims at benefi ting the creditor for a certain 
period of time (the fi nal determination of the 
claim) and might thus be provisional.
The question which arises is whether these 
references to the interim or provisional char-
acter of Article 13 relief should be considered 
as an indication that the intention of the draft-
ers was essentially to design a remedy for the 
purpose of meeting the needs which are typi-
cally met by interim remedies in national legal 
systems. If that were the case, the provisions 
of Article 13 should be consistent with the 
rules typically found in national legal systems. 
Another logical consequence would be that 
such rules could be used to supplement Article 
13 when needed, that is when Article 13 would 
not address a given issue. This, of course, would 
only be possible if the national laws of interim 
relief were not too diverse, and it happens to be 
that many aspects of the regime of certain kinds 
of interim remedies are remarkably similar in 
most jurisdictions.
(i) The concept of interim relief
If the drafters had in mind a concept of 
interim relief, what might it be? It is unlikely 
that it could have been a general concept, as 
it is doubtful that there is any. Interim relief 
is, in most legal systems, a remarkably diverse 
category. It encompasses a variety of remedies 
which serve many different purposes. There 
exists interim relief designed to freeze assets, to 
search premises, to order payment, to prevent 
given parties from doing a particular act, etc. 
The only commonality between these hugely 
diverse remedies seems to be that ‘they are not 
designed to provide a fi nal resolution of the 
matter in dispute’.10 They are not even all pro-
9 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 2.60 fn 16.
10 Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure 
– Principles of Practice (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 
para 9.1.
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visional: disclosure orders, for instance, are fi nal 
insofar as the information provided cannot be 
returned after the dispute has been settled on 
the merits.11
While it is clear that there is very little 
conceptual unity among all existing interim 
remedies, the situation is very different if one 
focuses on particular kinds of interim remedies. 
For present purposes, it is necessary to distin-
guish sharply between two categories. The fi rst 
is composed of process orders, which aim at 
regulating the litigation process, for instance 
by ensuring that evidence remains avail-
able, or documents are disclosed. The second 
is composed of remedies designed to protect 
substantive rights. In the context of Article 13 
of the Convention, we are clearly concerned 
with this second category of interim remedies. 
Article 13 is not concerned with the regulation 
of litigation before a competent adjudicator, 
but with the substantive rights of the creditor 
in the object, that is, the international interest.
The category of interim remedies aimed 
at protecting substantive rights is conceptu-
ally much more homogenous than the general 
category of interim relief. The reason why is 
that the goal that remedies of this kind pursue 
largely dictates their legal regime and, in 
particular, their conditions. The context is typi-
cally the following one. A plaintiff claims that 
a defendant is violating his substantive rights. 
If he wants to enforce these rights, however, 
a competent adjudicator must recognize them 
and order that they be enforced. The plaintiff 
must therefore bring proceedings before this 
adjudicator. In the meantime, however, the 
defendant might be violating them. An interim 
remedy should thus be available pending fi nal 
determination of the rights to avoid injustice. 
But as long as no competent adjudicator has 
recognised that the rights do exist, there is no 
compelling reason to enforce them, because 
11 The same is true of many interim remedies aiming 
at preserving or establishing evidence: if successful, the 
evidence will be available permanently: Marie-Laure 
Niboyet and Géraud de Geouffre de La Pradelle, Droit 
international privé (LGDJ 2007) para 603.
the adjudicator may eventually rule that they 
do not exist. This is the reason why English 
courts would not issue freezing orders pending 
fi nal determination of the pecuniary rights of 
plaintiffs12 until 1975 and the creation of the 
Mareva injunction.13
Fortunately, the laws of most jurisdictions 
afforded a remedy in such situations long 
before 1975. Today, they resolve the intractable 
problem of the protection of rights which are 
only alleged by the plaintiff in a remarkably 
similar way. First, the plaintiff is given a chance 
to show at an early stage of the proceedings 
that the rights that he alleges are likely to exist. 
Second, he is requested to demonstrate that 
there is a good reason to interfere in the business 
of the defendant immediately, before it is con-
fi rmed that the plaintiff is entitled to enforce his 
likely rights. Two requirements are thus found 
in virtually all legal systems. The fi rst is that the 
plaintiff should demonstrate that there is a sig-
nifi cant chance that he will win on the merits, 
and therefore that the rights the existence of 
which he alleges exist (fumus in boni juri). In 
the United Kingdom, courts will issue freezing 
orders only if satisfi ed that the applicant has a 
good arguable case (on the merits). 14 In France, 
creditors seeking to attach provisionally the 
assets of their alleged debtors must show that 
their rights exist ‘in principle’.15 In Germany, 
all provisional measures aiming at protecting 
substantive rights are subject to the common 
requirement of the applicant demonstrating 
that his rights are at least ‘credible’.16 In all these 
jurisdictions, however, it is not enough for the 
alleged creditor to show that the existence of 
12 See eg Mills v Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Co 
(1870) LR 5 Ch App 621, 628 (Lord Hatherley LC): 
‘the only remedy in that case for a creditor is to obtain 
his judgment and to take out execution’.
13 The Mareva injunction was renamed freezing order 
when English civil procedure was reformed in 1998.
14 Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrts GmbH & 
Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] 1 WLR 1412 (CA).
15 French Law no 91-650 du 9 July 1991, Article 67.
16 See eg Reinhold Greger in Richard Zöller and 
others, Zivilprozessordnung (29th edn, Schmidt 2012) 
§294 no 6.
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his rights is likely. He must also demonstrate 
that there is a good reason for interfering in 
the business of the defendant immediately. 
A second requirement is therefore that there 
should be a danger that the judgment which 
will eventually recognize the rights of the 
applicant might not be enforced (periculum in 
mora). In the United Kingdom, creditors apply-
ing for freezing orders must demonstrate that 
there is a real risk that the fi nal judgment will 
go unsatisfi ed.17 In France, creditors applying 
for provisional attachment orders must dem-
onstrate that payment of the judgment would 
otherwise be threatened.18 In Germany, the 
applicant must show that in the absence of the 
requested relief, the enforcement of the fi nal 
judgment would either be prevented or made 
signifi cantly more diffi cult.19
It is worthy of note that lawmakers have 
sometimes explored ways to avoid relying on 
the fi rst requirement, as assessing even roughly 
the merits of the case at an early stage of the 
proceedings, and often in haste, may prove 
diffi cult. Until 1974, English courts would 
issue interim injunction only if the applicant 
could show a prima facie case on the merits.20 
In American Cyanamid,21 the House of Lords 
reconsidered the prima facie test and established 
the general rule that the court should not con-
sider a case’s merits. Instead it should strive to 
balance the hardship to the applicant caused by 
refusal of relief against the hardship to the other 
party if he is temporarily bound by an injunc-
tion. This suggests that, at least in theory,22 an 
17 The Niedersachsen [1983] 1 WLR 1412 (CA).
18 French Law no 91-650 du 9 July 1991, Article 67.
19 German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) § 917 
and 935.
20 JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269 
(HL) 338–39 (Lord Upjohn).
21 American Cyanamid Ltd v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 
396 (HL).
22 The fact of the matter is that American Cyanamid 
did not entirely exclude consideration of the strengths 
of the parties’ case. The court held that, fi rst, the claim 
of the applicant should be serious, and second that, if 
the court would discover no real difference in weight 
between the parties’ respective potential hardships, it 
alternative model could be to focus exclusively 
on the potential hardships of the parties, that 
is, to design a more sophisticated periculum in 
mora test.
It should also be underlined that none of 
these jurisdictions make the issuance of interim 
relief conditional upon a prior agreement of 
the parties to that effect. Any person alleging 
that he is the creditor of another person may 
freely apply for interim relief. His right to do so 
is in no way conditional upon the acceptance of 
the alleged debtor. This is perfectly understand-
able, because the right to apply for an interim 
remedy is a mere consequence of the exist-
ence of the substantive rights of the creditor. 
If the right of the creditor exists, it necessarily 
entails a right to be paid in the general sense, 
that is, a right to demand and secure enforce-
ment. That is what rights are about: they are 
binding, and enforceable. There is no need to 
secure the agreement of debtors to that effect. 
Indeed, substantive rights are not necessarily 
contractual, and it might not even be possi-
ble to agree on anything with the debtor. But 
even contracts need not provide expressly that 
creditors will have the option of applying for 
interim relief. This is a remedy available to all 
creditors,23 just as the right to seek damages for 
non-performance is, in principle, available to 
all creditors.
(ii) Is relief pending fi nal determination interim 
relief?
Although the relief pending fi nal determina-
tion established by Article 13 of the Cape Town 
would consider the merits of their case as a tie-breaking 
factor. 
23 The German constitutional court went as far as 
ruling that the right to interim protection is a funda-
mental right (see German Constitutional Court, ruling 
of 19 October 1977, BVerfGE 46, 166 (177 f); NJW 
1978, 693). The European Court of Human Rights, 
has not yet ruled so, but it has ruled that the right to 
enforcement is one aspect of the fundamental right 
to a fair trial afforded by Article 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Hornsby v Greece (1997) 24 
EHRR 250).
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Convention may seem to have some common 
features with traditional interim relief, it is dif-
ferent in many ways.
At fi rst sight, the purpose of Article 13 
might appear to be clearly the mere protection 
of the substantive right of the creditor.24 This 
right is the ‘international interest’ established by 
the Convention. The effect of this right is to 
grant to its benefi ciary the ‘Default Remedies’ 
afforded by Chapter III of the Convention, 
which are essentially rights to use the object 
(managing it and collecting any income arising 
out of such management,25 taking possession 
of the object26) and rights to its value for the 
purpose of using it towards satisfaction of the 
secured obligations (selling it27 or vesting it in 
satisfaction28). If Article 13 were establishing 
interim remedies, it would be solely concerned 
with the preservation of the meaningfulness 
of those remedies. Article 13 provides for four 
remedies which all seem to aim at ensuring that 
the right either to the use or to the value of 
the object is preserved pending fi nal determi-
nation of the existence of that right. It should 
be underscored, however, that, in certain cir-
cumstances, some of these remedies may not 
only preserve the right of the creditor, but 
actually give him full satisfaction. This would 
be the case, for instance, of a conditional seller 
being allowed to take possession of the object.29 
Moreover, the Convention will always be 
applied in combination with a Protocol. Both 
the Aircraft and the Luxembourg Protocols 
allow contracting states to add to the remedies 
24 The Russian version of the title of Article 13 is 
‘temporary measures to protect rights’.
25 Convention, Article 8(1)(c). 
26 Article 8(1)(a). 
27 Article 8(1)(b).
28 Article 9.
29 This is indeed the fi nal remedy afforded by 
Article 10 of the Convention. Article 10 also provides, 
however, that the agreement should be terminated. In 
practice, one would think that the agreement would 
often provide that default would automatically result in 
termination of the agreement, and thus in an obligation 
to return the object.
of Article 13 the sale of the object.30 Although 
many states have declared that they would not 
avail themselves of this possibility,31 this new 
remedy sheds a new light on Article 13. Selling 
the object is not an interim measure. It cannot 
be undone, and gives satisfaction to the credi-
tor. It does not preserve any right to enforce 
the international interest. It actually enforces 
the interest, and it is fi nal.32
There are other differences, which are 
arguably even more fundamental. The most 
remarkable one is that Article 13 does not 
include any of the two requirements com-
monly found in national laws. First, Article 13 
does not provide that the creditor ought to 
demonstrate that he is only likely to succeed 
on the merits. Quite to the contrary, Article 13 
merely states that the creditor should provide 
evidence of default. In the French, Spanish and 
Russian versions of the Convention, there is no 
indication on the standard of proof, and thus 
no indication, either express or implicit, that it 
might be low or lower in any way33. The fi nal 
30 Aircraft Protocol, Article X(3); Luxembourg Pro-
tocol, Article VIII.
31 The United States, the European Union and 
Russia, for instance, have declared that they would not 
apply Article X(3) of the Aircraft Protocol.
32 It is worthy of note that the drafters had initially 
included the sale of the object in the remedies set out 
in Article 13. Several delegations objected, however, 
as they considered that the sale of the object had an 
element of fi nality which was not normally associated 
with interim relief (Diplomatic Conference, Commis-
sion of the Whole, 10th meeting, 6 November 2001, 
823). The delegation of the United Kingdom replied 
that ‘common law systems generally regarded a sale as 
a form of interim relief, particularly in cases where the 
subject matter of the dispute might be deteriorating or 
was otherwise at risk and it would be in the interests of 
both parties to allow for it to be sold and for the dispute 
to attach the proceeds of the sale’ (ibid 824). A compro-
mise was eventually found: by putting the sale of the 
object in the protocols rather than in the Convention, 
states could decide whether they wanted to opt in the 
protocol provision and make the sale of the object a 
Relief Pending Final Determination. 
33 The French text provides that ‘le créancier apporte 
la preuve de l’inexécution des obligations’. The use of 
‘la’ clearly means that all evidence should be adduced. 
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text certainly does not say that the creditor 
should only adduce ‘some evidence’ of default, 
or evidence of a ‘likely default’. One could 
argue differently for the English version, which 
provides that the creditor should ‘adduce’ evi-
dence of default. The use of this verb could be 
understood as an implicit reference to a lower 
standard of proof. But if that had actually been 
the goal of the drafters, it could have been said 
much more clearly, and as it was not, the use 
of the verb ‘adduce’ could also be interpreted 
as being neutral in this respect. The Offi cial 
Commentary states that the creditor must 
‘show’ of evidence of default,34 which sug-
gests that the use of the verb ‘adduce’ should 
not be overemphasised. In any case, given that 
most, if not all other equally authoritative ver-
sions of the Convention do not include any 
such implicit indication, it seems clear that the 
correct interpretation must be that Article 13 
does not provide for a lower standard of proof, 
and that creditors should therefore actually 
demonstrate that a default occurred. Legisla-
tive history supports this conclusion. At an 
early stage of the negotiation, the text actually 
provided that the creditor should ‘adduce prima 
facie evidence of default’. However, during the 
third Plenary Session of the Joint Session of the 
UNIDROIT Committee of Governmental 
Experts and the Sub-Committee of the ICAO 
Legal Committee held in Rome in March 
2000, ‘it was felt that the reference to prima 
facie evidence in the chapeau of the Article was 
not a suffi ciently high standard considering the 
effects of the remedies envisaged’. 35 It was pro-
posed instead to replace it with the word ‘clear’ 
(evidence), which would have considerably 
strengthened the standard of proof. A number 
Both the Spanish and the Russian texts do not include 
any indication of a lower standard of proof either 
(Spanish: ‘adduce prueba’, Russian: ‘Представляет 
доказательство’).
34 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 4.108.
35 UNIDROIT, Report of Third Joint Session 
(Rome, 20–31 March 2000) UNIDROIT CGE/Int 
Int/3-Report, para 106, www.unidroit.org/english/
documents/2000/study72/s-72-jointsession3-report-e.
pdf, accessed 26 July 2012.
of delegations did not have a strong opinion 
about this proposal, as they ‘indicated that 
the word “clear” which had been put in [the 
place of the words prima facie] was acceptable, 
but that they could also consider not includ-
ing it at all.’36 This last opinion prevailed, and 
the fi nal wording was adopted. It seems clear 
therefore that Article 13 should not be con-
sidered as setting a lower standard of proof. It 
is not enough to show that the creditor has a 
good chance of convincing the court in the 
main proceedings that a default has occurred.
Second, Article 13 does not mention the tradi-
tional requirement that there should be a risk 
that the fi nal judgment will go unsatisfi ed. One 
might be tempted to argue that there is always 
such risk when the substantive rights are to the 
use or the value of mobile equipment because 
mobile equipment is especially easy to move. If 
the equipment were moved to the territory of 
another Contracting state, however, the courts 
of that state would have jurisdiction to grant 
most of Article 13 remedies.37 The risk justify-
ing immediate interference in the business of 
the defendant would then not be obvious. One 
possible interpretation is thus that Article 13 
does not mention this requirement because it is 
not relevant given the nature of the relief that 
it affords.
Another fundamental difference between 
Article 13 and traditional interim relief is that 
Article 13 relief is only available ‘to the extent 
that the debtor has at any time so agreed’. The 
consequence is that Article 13 relief will have 
to be stipulated in the agreement creating or 
providing for the international interest, or 
in any other agreement of the parties. In the 
absence of such a clause, Article 13 relief will 
be unavailable. As already noted, this is not 
only unknown in comparative civil procedure, 
but it is against the essence and the purpose 
of traditional interim relief. Nowadays, interim 
36 Ibid para 113. 
37 Convention, Article 43(1). The local court would 
not have jurisdiction to grant a lease or management of 
the object, on the ground that this would not be an in 
rem, but rather an in personam remedy.
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protection is not a favour granted by debtors 
to creditors. It is a direct consequence of the 
binding character of the substantive rights 
of the parties, and in particular of their con-
tractual undertakings. Creditors have certain 
minimum procedural rights which come with 
their substantive rights. One is the right to seek 
enforcement of their rights, whether by way of 
specifi c performance or through an award of 
damages. Another is the right to obtain interim 
protection of these expectations. Agreement, 
by contrast, is the basis for more advanced and 
sophisticated remedies that debtors will not 
grant to all their creditors. Debtors, for instance, 
grant security to some of their creditors only, 
who become secured creditors.
To say the least, the relief established by 
Article 13 does not fi t neatly in the model of 
interim relief commonly found in national 
legal systems. One could easily be tempted 
to conclude that, despite the use of the term 
interim relief by the Convention, Article 13 
establishes a very different kind of remedy.
(b) Advance enforcement remedy
The essential differences between traditional 
interim remedies and Article 13 relief suggest 
that the intent of the drafters might have been 
to establish an advance enforcement remedy.
The international interest established by 
the Convention is a contractual security. As 
such, it has logically been designed to secure 
satisfaction of the obligations of the debtor 
by granting default remedies to the creditor. 
Default remedies are thus an essential part of 
the substantive right of the creditor, and pretty 
much defi ne it. They are the substance of the 
international interest. The only chapter of the 
Convention which defi nes the content of the 
international interest is Chapter III, which is 
dedicated to Default Remedies.
Article 13 is located in Chapter III of the 
Convention. This suggests that Article 13 relief 
is merely one of the contractual remedies 
established by the Convention to enforce the 
substantive right that it creates, that is, the inter-
national interest. Article 13 relief has indeed 
many common features with the other default 
remedies found in Chapter III. First, it is only 
available if the debtor has so agreed. All default 
remedies of Chapter III are also contractual 
remedies which must be granted by the agree-
ment of the parties.38 Second, a requirement 
common to all default remedies of Chapter III is 
the existence of an event of default. This is only 
logical, as the goal of any security is precisely 
to afford remedies in such a case. Article 13 also 
provides that relief pending fi nal determination 
should only be available to creditors adducing 
evidence of default. Third, the actual remedies 
afforded by Article 13(1) are the same as those 
afforded by other provisions of Chapter III. 
More specifi cally, the remedies available under 
Article 13(1) and the remedies that the chargee 
may exercise pursuant to Article 8(1) are very 
similar: virtually all remedies available under 
Article 8(1) are available under Article 13(1). In 
both cases, the creditor may request possession, 
control or custody of the object,39 management 
of the income of the object,40 and lease of the 
object.41 One could object that Article 8(1) also 
includes the sale of the object and that Article 
13(1) does not, but it was already seen that both 
the Aircraft Protocol and the Luxembourg Pro-
tocol allow Contracting states to add to the list 
of Article 13(1) remedies the sale of the aircraft.
The relief established by Article 13 does not 
appear to be essentially different from the other 
Default Remedies afforded by Chapter III to 
enforce the international interest. If one views 
Relief Pending Final Termination as merely 
one Default Remedy among many others, it is 
easy to explain why Article 13 lacks so many of 
the features of traditional interim relief.
Article 13 is, however, different from other 
remedies of Chapter III in one important 
respect. Article 13 provides that creditors shall 
obtain from a court ‘speedy’ relief. Article X(2) 
38 See Articles 8 and 9. See also Article 15, providing 
that the parties are free to derogate from any provisions 
of Chapter III, subject to a few exceptions. 
39 Compare Articles 13(1)(b) and 8(1)(a).
40 Compare Articles 13(1)(d) and 8(1)(c).
41 Compare Articles 13(1)(d) and 8(1)(b).
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of the Aircraft Protocol encourages Contract-
ing states to specify the number of days in 
which their courts will grant the remedy, and 
many states have indeed committed to a sur-
prisingly short time, 10 days for in rem remedies 
and 30 days for in personam remedies.42
One possible interpretation could therefore 
be that speed would be the essential feature of 
Article 13. Its purpose would not be to offer 
special remedies which would otherwise be 
unavailable. It would be to ensure that basic 
enforcement remedies would be available very 
quickly. Article 13 would increase the effi cacy 
of the international interest by making it virtu-
ally immediately enforceable in case of default. 
The essence of Article 13 would be speed, and 
the most accurate way to refer to it would be 
to call it ‘advance relief ’, as the Offi cial Com-
mentary does.43
Is relief pending fi nal determination provisional?
If this analysis were accepted, it would raise the 
issue of whether Article 13 remedies should be 
considered as provisional in character.
This matter is not clearly settled by the 
Convention. In the French and Spanish ver-
sions, the title of Article 13 characterizes the 
remedies as ‘provisional’, or ‘provisory’. In the 
English version, the title is Relief Pending 
Final Determination, which implies that such 
relief is only available until fi nal determina-
tion, and may well lapse afterwards. Neither 
Article 13, nor any other provision of the 
Convention, however, expressly mentions that 
Article 13 remedies might lapse at any given 
time. The reason why provisional measures are 
not fi nal is that they are granted without full 
judicial determination of the dispute. They are 
therefore meant to last only until such deter-
mination is made. Article 13 relief, however, 
is only available after full judicial determina-
tion of the dispute. The creditor must provide 
42 So have China, India, the United Arab Emirates, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Luxembourg.
43 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 4.108.
evidence of default. If he satisfi es a court that 
an event of default has occurred, one cannot 
see why he could not get a fi nal decision, and 
a fi nal remedy. Certainly, even if the remedy 
he had obtained was labelled ‘provisional’, he 
would have no particular incentive to continue 
to litigate for the purpose of obtaining the exact 
same remedy a year later. The debtor would 
have an incentive to try to obtain a different 
decision, but after failing once to demonstrate 
that there had not been an event of default, 
he may conclude that his chances of doing so 
would be lower, and give up.
In this respect, an interesting comparison is 
with the remedy of interim payment afforded 
by some European jurisdictions. Under French 
civil procedure, for instance, creditors may peti-
tion a special division of the court to obtain an 
order for provisional payment for up to 100% of 
the claim at an early stage of the proceedings.44 
The requirement is that the creditor demon-
strates that the existence of the claim cannot 
be seriously disputed. In theory, the payment is 
only provisional. Another court should rule on 
the merits and issue a fi nal ruling on the claim. 
In practice, however, proceedings very often 
end after the provisional payment has been 
granted. The creditor is satisfi ed and has no 
incentive to pursue the main proceedings. In 
particular, he would not be sanctioned for not 
doing so, for instance by being asked to refund 
the payment. The debtor realizes that he has at 
best a weak case, is reluctant to incur additional 
costs for pursuing a most unlikely outcome, 
and has lost the incentive of delaying payment. 
A remedy labelled ‘provisional’ is most often, in 
effect, fi nal.
Such could be the fate of Article 13. There is 
no indication in the Convention or the Proto-
cols that the remedies issued provisionally by an 
Article 13 court would lapse if no court issues 
44 ‘Référé provision’: French Code of Civil Proce-
dure, Article 809.
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a fi nal ruling on the claim.45 It could therefore 
be that creditors satisfi ed by Article 13 relief, 
for instance conditional sellers who would have 
been granted possession of the object, would 
simply abandon the proceedings on the merits, 
and that debtors would understand that their 
chances of obtaining any other outcome would 
be very low. The only instances where credi-
tors would have an incentive to obtain a fi nal 
determination would be where different relief 
would then be available, for instance the sale of 
the aircraft in jurisdictions which did not agree 
to add it to the list in Article 13(1).
3. Two models for Article 13
The language of Article 13 and other relevant 
provisions of the Convention and the Proto-
cols does not allow a fi nal conclusion on the 
nature of Article 13 relief to be reached. It 
simply does not fi t with any of the remedies 
commonly found in national legal systems. As 
the delegation of the United States of America 
stated in the negotiations of the Convention, 
Article 13 has established ‘a hybrid between a 
fi nal remedies provision and one that addresses 
interim relief ’.46 One could conclude that this 
shows that Article 13 should be considered as 
establishing an autonomous sui generis remedy. 
This conclusion, however, would not be very 
helpful. First, it would not give any guidance 
to future Convention interpreters as to how 
to supplement Article 13, which is manifestly 
incomplete. Second, it would overlook that if 
Article 13 is to be useful to any party, it has 
to have a clear purpose. It will only apply if 
commercial parties provide for its application, 
and they will only do so for reaching a particu-
lar goal. Furthermore, they will want to know 
45 Article 43(3) of the Convention provides that 
‘fi nal determination … will or may take place in a 
court of another Contracting State or by arbitration’, 
which suggests that petitioning this adjudicator is not 
an obligation.
46 UNIDROIT CGE/Int Int/3-WP/25. 
what they are actually establishing through an 
Article 13 clause.
This is the reason why I propose below two 
models for Article 13. The rationale for each 
of them is a particular goal that parties might 
want to pursue when availing themselves of the 
possibility of stipulating for Article 13 remedies 
in their contract. The models will then consist 
of a set of rules and interpretation consistent 
with the particular goal that the parties have 
chosen to pursue.
None of these regimes will be exactly in 
accordance with the language of Article 13 and 
other relevant provisions of the Convention 
and the Protocols. But Article 13 is essentially 
a default or facilitative regime. Parties are free 
to vary or amend the vast majority of its provi-
sions.47 If parties were interested in resorting to 
Article 13 for achieving one particular purpose, 
they should make it clear by providing so, and 
by stipulating a legal regime consistent with 
this purpose.
If the parties have provided for the appli-
cation of Article 13 in a very short provision, 
courts might want to assess the will of the 
parties and to interpret Article 13 accordingly.
(a) Interim relief
A fi rst possible analysis of Article 13 would be 
that its goal is to preserve the substantive rights 
of the creditors pending the fi nal determina-
tion of their claim. On this view, Article 13 
would offer merely protective remedies aiming 
exclusively at ensuring that the substantive 
right of the creditor could be meaningfully 
enforced when fi nally recognized by a compe-
tent adjudicator.
47 Convention, Article 15. The only exception is 
Article 13(2). But both the Aircraft Protocol and the 
Luxembourg Protocol offer the possibility to Con-
tracting States to turn Article 13(2) into a default rule. 
Moreover, Article 13(2) gives power to courts to impose 
certain terms, but does not force them to do so. If a 
court was satisfi ed that Article 13(2)(b) was inconsistent 
with the goal pursued by the parties when providing 
for the application of Article 13, one would hope that it 
would refrain from using its power.
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Such analysis would logically entail the 
following consequences. First, it would make 
sense to require the creditor to show that there 
is a need for protecting his rights. Second, the 
procedure for obtaining such a remedy should 
be designed in such a way that it could effi -
ciently fulfi l its goal. It would be necessary, for 
instance, to allow the creditor to petition the 
court ex parte and to obtain the Article 13 relief 
without giving prior notice to the debtor. It 
would also be necessary to adapt the features 
of the procedure to its accelerated nature, for 
instance by allowing the creditor to meet only 
a lower standard of proof. Third, as the purpose 
of the remedies would be to protect substan-
tive rights, the effect of the remedies should be 
conditional upon the creditor actually seeking 
to enforce them, and being successful. If the 
creditor actually did not seek fi nal determina-
tion of his claims, or if he lost on the merits, his 
interim relief should lapse.
As was already noted, many of the features 
of the legal regime established by Article 13 do 
not correspond to this model. It would there-
fore be necessary to adapt some of them. First, 
it would be necessary to interpret loosely the 
requirement that the creditor should adduce 
evidence of default, and to accept instead 
that the creditor adduce credible evidence 
of default. Second, the question would arise 
whether the creditor should show that there 
is a risk that a ruling fi nally determining his 
claim would go unsatisfi ed. Article 13 does not 
mention it, and it is hard to believe that the 
requirement was not omitted on purpose. One 
way forward could be to consider that given 
that the substantive rights to be protected are 
rights over mobile equipment, it would be pre-
sumed that the threat to the creditor’s rights 
exists. The creditor would not need to dem-
onstrate its existence when applying for the 
remedy. However, at a later stage, the debtor 
would be entitled to rebut the presumption, 
and to show that there is no real danger that he 
would dispose of the object during the time of 
main proceedings.
Understanding Article 13 as establishing an 
interim remedy would also be helpful to give 
guidance to courts on important procedural 
issues on which the provision says very little. 
First, Article 13 offers limited guidance as to 
whether the court may issue Article 13 relief 
ex parte.48 In an interim relief model, the goal 
would be to preserve rights against the risk 
of dissipation of the object. The power of the 
court to issue ex parte Article 13 relief would 
be essential. The debtor would of course be 
offered a chance to challenge the order imme-
diately after implementation, and to try to 
demonstrate that the requirements were not 
met. Second, Article 13 does not say much 
regarding the relationship between the main 
proceedings and Article 13 proceedings.49 In 
an interim relief model, it would be logical to 
make the grant of the Article 13 relief condi-
tional upon the creditor initiating the main 
proceedings within a fi x period of time. If the 
creditor were to fail to do so, the interim relief 
could lapse automatically. Similarly, it would be 
logical to consider that the interim relief would 
lapse if the creditor lost on the merits. Article 
13(2) envisages the possibility of the court 
imposing terms necessary to protect the debtor 
in the event that the creditor ‘fails to establish 
its claim … on the fi nal determination of that 
claim.’50
(b) Advance enforcement remedy
A second possible analysis of Article 13 would 
be that it establishes an additional contractual 
remedy designed to provide the creditor with 
a special enforcement remedy of his right in 
the object. On this view, the goal of the Relief 
would not be essentially to preserve the right 
of the creditor, but rather and more directly to 
enforce it. Article 13 would provide the credi-
tor with early satisfaction of his substantive 
right.
48 Article 13(3) could be interpreted as granting dis-
cretion to courts in this respect.
49 In the Spanish version of the Convention, the 
title of Article 13 is ‘provisional measure subject to fi nal 
determination’.
50 Article 13(2)(b).
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Such analysis would entail the following 
consequences. First, as the goal would not be 
merely to protect the rights of the creditor, but 
to enforce them, the latter should demonstrate 
that the rights he is seeking to enforce exist. 
The requirement that he adduces evidence of 
default should be interpreted as a requirement 
to provide full evidence of default. Second, the 
contractual character of the relief would become 
essential. This is because there is no right to 
early satisfaction. While interim protection 
should always be available to protect substan-
tive rights, enforcement is typically available in 
due course, after a court has fi nally recognized 
the existence of the rights. Debtors are free, 
however, to grant to certain creditors special 
remedies which will enable early enforcement 
and satisfaction of the rights. Third, as a remedy 
which would not be designed to preserve the 
rights of the creditor, it would be unnecessary 
to require that the creditor shows that there is 
a need to protect his rights, and there would be 
no reason to allow ex parte proceedings. Fourth, 
as a remedy designed to provide early satisfac-
tion, there would be no particular reason for it 
to be provisional. The remedy should therefore 
last until repealed and it should not lapse for 
the sole reason that both parties neglected to 
seek fi nal determination of their claims.51
4. Availability of national relief
Article 13 relief is not exclusive. Article 13(4) 
expressly provides that Article 13 does not limit 
the availability of forms of interim relief other 
than those set out in Article 13(1). The Offi -
cial Commentary explains that ‘the creditor 
remains entitled to invoke any other form of 
51 Indeed, fi nal determination would already have 
been made by the court granting the Article 13 relief, 
and it could be argued that this decision would be res 
judicata and would therefore prevent any subsequent 
court from ruling again on the existence of the sub-
stantive right. The rationale for the power of the court 
to impose terms necessary to protect the debtor should 
the creditor fail to establish his claim in the main pro-
ceedings under Article 13(2) would disappear.
interim relief that may be available under the 
lex fori’52 and goes on to give an example: ‘an 
order for interim payment by the debtor’. 53
The purpose of Article 13(4) is clearly to 
allow courts to supplement Article 13(1) by 
granting forms of remedies which are not 
among the four remedies listed in Article 13(1). 
The example given by the Offi cial Commen-
tary is telling. Article 13(1) does not mention 
orders for interim payment. This silence should 
not be interpreted as excluding the power of 
the competent court to grant such remedy 
under national law.
(a) Scope
The scope of Article 13(4), however, is unclear. 
The fi rst question which arises is whether 
Article 13(4) only allows courts to grant other 
forms of remedies, or whether it also allows 
courts to grant the same remedies under dif-
ferent conditions. For instance, while Article 13 
demands that the creditor adduce evidence of 
default, many courts will have the power under 
national law to allow provisional attachment 
of the object if satisfi ed that the creditor only 
has a good arguable case on the merits. Does 
Article 13(4) allow creditors to apply for such 
remedy?
This question is diffi cult to answer because 
of the unclear nature of the relief established 
by Article 13. If Article 13 was understood 
as establishing a set of remedies specifi cally 
designed to meet a particular goal, it would 
be tempting to argue that Article 13 should 
exclusively govern remedies sought to meet 
that particular goal, and would not govern at 
all remedies sought for other purposes. But 
the purpose of Article 13 is unclear, and so 
is consequently its subject matter scope. The 
subject matter scope of Article 13 could be 
clarifi ed by the parties, however, by stipulating 
that their purpose is either to design an interim 
remedy, or an advance enforcement remedy.54 
52 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 4.112.
53 Ibid.
54 See Section 3 ‘Two Models for Article 13’.
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The logical consequence would be to apply 
the stipulated legal regime, and to prevent them 
from shopping around and trying to obtain a 
similar remedy available under different con-
ditions in the national laws of the competent 
courts.
The second question that the scope of 
Article 13(4) raises is whether Article 13(4) 
only applies in cases where the parties have not 
reached an express agreement on the availabil-
ity of the remedy in question. It seems clear 
that Article 13(4) was drafted precisely for cases 
where parties would have remained silent on 
the availability of a particular remedy, and more 
specifi cally a remedy other than those listed in 
Article 13(1). In such cases, national law con-
trols, and the said remedy will be available if 
national laws so provide. But what about cases 
where the parties have stipulated that another 
form of relief would be available? Article 15 of 
the Convention allows them to derogate from 
any provision of Chapter III, and thus to add 
remedies which do not appear in Article 13(1). 
Would the provision of another form of relief 
in the contract exclude the power of courts to 
grant similar remedies under national law?
To answer this question, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between remedies established by the 
Convention and other remedies. The four 
remedies listed in Article 13(1) are remedies 
established by the Convention. Their legal 
regime is thus largely defi ned by the Conven-
tion.55 Although Article 15 of the Convention 
enables the parties to derogate from Article 
13, including Article 13(1), it is doubtful that 
it empowers them to create novel Convention 
remedies. If the parties provide for the avail-
ability of a form of interim relief other than 
as set out in Article 13(1), they necessarily 
refer to remedies existing and established by 
the applicable national law. Their legal regime 
is thus defi ned by national law. Whether the 
stipulation that another form of remedy will be 
available would infl uence the power of courts 
55 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 4.108. 
Article 14, however, provides that such remedies are 
exercised in conformity with national civil procedure. 
to grant that same remedy will be a question 
for the applicable national law, not the Con-
vention.
(b) Applicable Law
Remedies other than those set out in Article 
13(1) will only be available if the applicable 
law so provides. The Offi cial Commentary 
suggests that the applicable law is the law of 
the forum.56 The view is consistent with their 
characterization as interim relief, as it is almost 
universally accepted that procedure is governed 
by the law of the forum.
Despite this express characterization, I have 
showed that the nature of the relief established 
by Article 13 is far from clear. In any case, the 
parties must provide for its application, and are 
free to derogate from Article 13 and to design 
relief that fi ts their needs. A possible charac-
terization of Article 13 is thus that it offers an 
advance enforcement remedy. An important 
consequence of this alternative characterization 
would be that the application of the law of the 
forum would not be as obvious. Contractual 
remedies are essentially, though not necessarily 
exclusively, governed by the law of the contract. 
The law of the forum only remains relevant 
for determining the extent of the powers of 
the court. For instance, Article 12(1)(c) of the 
Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations57 provides that the law 
of the contract governs ‘within the limits of the 
powers conferred on the court by its proce-
dural law, the consequences of a total or partial 
breach of obligations’, which in all likelihood 
includes the availability of fi nal remedies.58
It should also be underscored that the 
remedy sought under national law might 
have an in rem effect.59 In such a case, under 
56 Ibid para 4.112.
57 Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(Rome I) [2008] OJ L177.
58 See Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Confl ict of Laws 
(14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) para 32-203.
59 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 4.288.
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the private international law rules of many 
jurisdictions, the law of the place of the object 
would apply, often both to the creation of the 
in rem right and to its effect.
5. Jurisdiction to grant Article 13 relief
Contrary to other international conventions 
unifying rules of commercial law, the Cape 
Town treaty does not neglect jurisdictional 
issues. Chapter XII of the Convention lays 
down three rules of jurisdiction to entertain 
claims under the Convention. The fi rst is a 
general rule of jurisdiction: Article 42 provides 
that choice of court agreements should be 
enforced. The drafters deliberately chose not to 
include any subsidiary rule for cases where the 
parties remained silent on jurisdiction.60 The 
second rule is specifi cally dedicated to claims 
under Article 13 of the Convention: Article 
43 gives jurisdiction to grant Article 13 relief 
both to courts chosen by the parties pursuant 
to Article 42 and to either the court of the ter-
ritory in which the object is situated or the 
court of the territory in which the debtor is 
situated.61
The existence of a special rule of jurisdic-
tion for granting relief under Article 13 will 
be perceived by many interpreters as clear 
indication (if not confi rmation) that such relief 
is interim relief. It is very common in inter-
national conventions on international civil 
procedure to distinguish between jurisdiction 
on the merits and jurisdiction to grant interim 
relief. The most famous example is certainly 
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(the ‘Brussels I Regulation’), which provides 
for, on the one hand, numerous rules of juris-
diction to entertain the merits of the dispute 
and, on the other hand, a special rule of juris-
60 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 2.156.
61 Chapter XII of the Convention contains two 
other provisions on jurisdiction which are not relevant 
for the purposes of this article.
diction for Provisional, including Protective, 
Measures.62 Furthermore, this special rule of 
jurisdiction, like Article 43, does not supersede, 
but rather supplements the rules of jurisdic-
tion on the merits. The model of the Brussels 
I Regulation is followed by a variety of other 
European regulations63 and conventions64. It 
is thus unsurprising that the European Union 
has declared that it would only apply Article 13 
of the Convention in accordance with Article 
31 of the Brussels I Regulation, which is the 
provision of that Regulation dealing with pro-
visional measures.65 
Article 43 distinguishes between two kinds 
of Article 13 remedies. Orders to preserve 
the object and its value, to transfer possession 
control of custody of the object or to immobi-
lise it are seen as remedies acting in rem.66 Article 
43(1) grants jurisdiction to issue such orders 
both to the court of the contracting state on 
the territory of which the object is situated and 
to the court chosen by parties (if any). In rem 
remedies will have to be eventually enforced 
in the state of the location of the object, and 
it is thus logical to grant jurisdiction to the 
court of this state to allow creditors to obtain 
immediately enforceable remedies and to fully 
benefi t from the speedy nature of Article 13 
relief. Orders to lease or to manage the object 
62 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L012, Article 31.
63 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 
November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility [2003] 
OJ L338, Article 20; Council Regulation (EC) No 
4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applica-
ble law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obliga-
tions [2009] OL L7/1, Article 14.
64 Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [2007] OJ L339, Article 31.
65 Declaration by the European Community pursu-
ant to Article 55 of the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment (n 65) annex II, para I.
66 Offi cial Commentary, Goode (n 1) para 4.287.
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are conceived as in personam remedies.67 There 
is thus no need to give jurisdiction to the court 
of the location of the object. Article 43(2) gives 
jurisdiction to the chosen court, but also to the 
court of the state on the territory of which the 
debtor is situated if the creditor only wants to 
enforce his order in this last state.
(a) European Union
The European Union has declared that the 
member states of the European Union ‘will 
apply Articles 13 and 43 of the Cape Town 
Convention for interim relief only in accord-
ance with Article 31 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities’.68 
As already noted, Article 31 of the Brussels 
I Regulation is a special provision dealing 
with Provisional, including Protective, Meas-
ures. The Declaration suggests that European 
offi cials have interpreted Article 13 of the Con-
vention as establishing a provisional measure in 
the meaning of Article 31 of the Regulation. 
The Brussels I Regulation does not defi ne this 
concept, but the European Court of Justice 
has done so in its Reichert decision.69 The 
concept of Provisional, including Protective, 
Measures ‘must be understood as referring to 
measures which, in matters within the scope 
of the [Brussels I Regulation] are intended 
to preserve a factual and legal situation so as 
to safeguard rights, the recognition of which 
is sought elsewhere from the courts having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’.70 
In accordance with the traditional concept 
67 Ibid.
68 Council Decision 2009/370/EC of 6 April 2009 
on the accession of the European Community to the 
Convention on international interests in mobile equip-
ment and its Protocol on matters specifi c to aircraft 
equipment [2009] OJ L121, Annex II, para I.
69 Case C-261/90 Reichert and Kockler [1992] ECR 
I-2149.
70 Reichert and Kockler, para 34. The Court has repeat-
edly referred to this defi nition since then: see Case 
C-391/95 Van Uden Maritime BV v Kommanditgesells-
chaft in Firma Deco-Line [1998] ECR I-07091, para 37; 
of interim relief, the purpose of Article 31 is 
clearly to safeguard rights. Measures designed 
to provide satisfaction to the plaintiff, by con-
trast, do not correspond to this model. The 
European Court of Justice has indeed excluded 
from the scope of Article 31 measures which, 
though provisional in theory, might in effect 
be fi nal and thus preempt the main decision, 
unless the applicant was ready to offer a guar-
antee that the measure would be undone if 
he were to lose in the main proceedings. As 
a consequence, the Court held that an order 
for interim payment would only qualify if the 
creditor offered a guarantee of repayment to 
the defendant should he lose on the merits.71 
It seems clear, therefore, that Article 31 would 
only apply to Article 13 relief if the latter was 
understood, or designed, as a genuine interim 
remedy. By contrast, it would not apply to 
Article 13 relief understood, or designed, as an 
advance enforcement remedy.
Yet, if Article 31 were found to be 
in applicable, this would not mean that courts 
of the member states would lack jurisdiction 
to grant Article 13 relief. As was made clear by 
the European Court of Justice in its Van Uden 
decision, Article 31 only defi nes the ancillary 
jurisdiction of the courts of member states to 
grant provisional measures.72 Courts having 
jurisdiction on the merits of the claim have 
general and unlimited jurisdiction to grant 
provisional measures, and indeed any measure 
available under their national law, whether 
 provisional or not. All courts having juris-
diction as to the substance of the claim under 
the Brussels I Regulation would also have juris-
diction to grant Article 13 relief. In this respect, 
the form of Article 13 relief, and indeed the 
 defi nition laid down by the Court of Justice 
for the purpose of Article 31 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, would be irrelevant.
Case C-104/03 St Paul Dairy Industries NV v Unibel 
Exser BVBA [2005] ECR I-03481, para 13. 
71 Van Uden, para 47; C-99/96 Mietz v Intership Yacht-
ing Sneek BV [1999] ECR I 2277, para 43.
72 Van Uden, para 19.
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Finally, it must be underscored that the 
Brussels I Regulation is not of general applica-
tion. It only applies as between certain member 
states, and when the defendant is domiciled 
within the territory of one of these member 
states.73 As the European Union made clear in 
its Declaration, it has only reserved the applica-
tion of the Brussels I Regulation to cases where 
it applies, that is, ‘where the debtor is domiciled 
in the territory of a Member State of the Com-
munity’, and as ‘between Member states bound 
[by the Brussels I Regulation]’. Denmark is not 
bound by the Brussels I Regulation.74 The Dec-
laration will therefore only constrain member 
states when the defendant is domiciled in the 
European Union, excluding Denmark. With 
respect to defendants domiciled outside of the 
European Union, courts of the member states 
will apply their national law regarding inter-
national jurisdiction, and will thus be free to 
apply Article 43 of the Convention.
In summary, the impact of the Declaration 
of the European Union is as follows. When the 
defendant is not domiciled in the European 
Union, the Brussels I Regulation would not 
apply. Article 43 of the Convention would be 
left untouched. When the defendant is domi-
ciled in the European Union, courts having 
jurisdiction on the merits would have juris-
diction to grant Article 13 relief. If the parties 
have included a jurisdiction agreement, only 
the chosen court will have jurisdiction on the 
merits. Other courts of the member states will 
have jurisdiction under Article 31 of the Brus-
sels I Regulation to grant provisional measures 
73 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L012, Article 2.
74 The Declaration of the European Union made 
pursuant to Article 48(2) specifi cally states that it does 
not apply to Denmark: (n 65), annex I, para I(3). The 
Declaration made pursuant to Article 55 does not (n 
65) annex II, para I. Denmark is not bound by the 
Brussels I Regulation. But it has entered into a separate 
agreement in 2005 with the European Union to extend 
the application of the Regulation to its territory [2005] 
OJ L299/62.
if their national law allows. If Article 13 relief 
was designed as an interim remedy, Article 43 
of the Convention could apply through Article 
31 of the Brussels I Regulation. If Article 13 
relief was designed as an advance enforcement 
remedy, Article 43 of the Convention could 
not apply. But courts of the member states 
could still be petitioned to grant interim relief 
as available under their national laws.
6. Conclusion
In an effort to determine the legal effect of 
Article 13 of the Convention, I have tried to 
assess the purpose of this provision. I have found 
that neither the language nor the legislative 
history of Article 13 allow a fi nal conclusion to 
be reached in this respect. This is unfortunate as 
Article 13 is far from being a complete provi-
sion, and will need to be supplemented, in one 
way or another, to address the issues that it does 
not expressly settle.
There is hope, however, for two reasons. 
First, in contrast with other commercial law 
treaties, the Cape Town Convention will be 
used by sophisticated actors who will be able 
to defi ne their needs and to assess how best to 
meet them. Second, Article 13 is essentially a 
default regime that can be varied by the parties. 
This feature gives them and their lawyers the 
necessary legal tool to stipulate advance rem-
edies which will meet their needs.
This is why it appeared to me that the best 
way forward is to clarify which needs Article 
13 may be used to satisfy, and to design differ-
ent models aimed at satisfying those particular 
needs. I have identifi ed two of them, and thus 
offer two models for Article 13. These models, 
of course, do not appear in the language of 
Article 13. They do not purport, however, to 
re-write the text of the Convention. They 
simply rely on the freedom of contract enjoyed 
by commercial parties, and the belief that they 
will always know best what their needs are, and 
how best to meet them. 
